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Abstract
The American Jewish community has historically overshadowed Canadian Jew-
ry. In population size, political prestige, and global influence, the power imbalance 
between American- and Canadian-Jewish organizations throughout the twentieth 
century has anchored popular understandings of North American Jewish affairs 
as one dominated by the U.S. Whereas the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee (JDC) shepherded international Jewish causes throughout this peri-
od, its Canadian analogue, the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), never achieved 
such stature. However, on an island ninety miles from the U.S. coast, the fragile 
geopolitics of the Cold War conspired to recast this relationship. The Castro Rev-
olution initiated a process which culminated in the severing of U.S.-Cuban ties in 
1961, leaving a precarious Cuban Jewish community vulnerable. Canada’s geo-
graphic proximity and close institutional ties with American Jewry transformed the 
CJC’s role as the primary caregivers of Cuban Jewry. Consequently, the sundering 
of American-Cuban relations elevated the CJC to a position of strategic prominence 
on the international stage ultimately overshadowing its larger, and more illustrious, 
cousin to the south in Cuba. 
Résumé
La communauté juive américaine a historiquement éclipsé la communauté juive 
canadienne. En termes de population, de prestige politique et d’influence mon-
diale, le déséquilibre de pouvoir entre les organisations juives américaines et ca-
nadiennes tout au long du XXe siècle a ancré la compréhension populaire que les 
affaires juives nord-américaines étaient dominées par les États-Unis. Alors que le  
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) a dirigé des causes juives 
internationales tout au long de cette période, son analogue canadien, le Congrès juif 
canadien (CJC), n’a jamais atteint une telle stature. Cependant, sur une île située à 
quatre-vingt-dix milles des côtes américaines, la fragile géopolitique de la guerre 
froide a contribué à modifier cette relation. La révolution de Castro a lancé un 
processus qui a abouti à la rupture des liens américano-cubains en 1961, laissant 
une communauté juive cubaine précaire vulnérable. La proximité géographique du 
Canada et les liens institutionnels étroits avec la communauté juive américaine ont 
transformé le rôle du CJC en tant que principal allié de la communauté juive cu-
baine. Par conséquent, la rupture des relations américano-cubaines a élevé le CJC 
à une position d’importance stratégique sur la scène internationale, éclipsant fina-
lement à Cuba son plus grand et plus illustre cousin du sud.
Historically, American Jewish institutional life has played a disproportionate role 
in supporting other parts of the diaspora.1 From the 1903 Kishinev pogrom relief 
efforts, onwards throughout the century’s historical landmarks of Jewish life—the 
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1967 Six-Day War, the Free Soviet Jewry movement, and even the Jonathan Pollard 
case—diasporic affairs has been one dominated by the American Jewry.2 
In part, this institutional power is a result of demographics. Representing forty per-
cent of the worldwide Jewish population, America is comfortably the largest di-
asporic community outside of Israel.3 Equally, American Jewish institutions derive 
power from the underlying trajectory of the United States. As Henry Luce foreshad-
owed in his now-famous Time article nearly a century ago, the United States was 
on the precipice of entering, “The American Century.”4 The centrality of the Unit-
ed States throughout the twentieth century as an architect of postwar multilateral 
institutions as well as a global hegemon elevated the prominence and influence of 
American Jewish institutional sway.
Nonetheless, the perceived unipolar nature of Jewish diasporic affairs has com-
pressed modern conceptions of its dynamism. Circumstances arise that negate such 
power. Indeed, throughout this era of American geopolitical ascendance, one notable 
exception broke the mould. Amid the global forces of the Cold War and alliance 
blocs, nuclear strategy and economic embargoes, a small nation ninety miles from 
American shores confounded the most powerful Jewish diasporic institutions. The 
1959 Cuban Revolution and the subsequent severing of bilateral ties, barred Americans 
from travelling to the island nation. Incapable of directly assisting Cuban Jewry, Can-
ada’s geographic proximity and close institutional ties with the United States ensured 
that Canadian Jewry became the primary conduit to the Cuban Jewish community. 
Ossified traditional roles were rapidly broken. The Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), 
the community’s primary organizational body, often depended upon American Jew-
ish institutions. For instance, the CJC relied upon the American Jewish Joint Distri-
bution Committee (JDC) to funnel money to European Jews throughout the Second 
World War.5 Similarly, following the Six-Day War, the CJC privately acknowledged 
the organization’s limitations in international Jewish affairs citing the community’s 
size and the nation’s restrained presence on the world stage.6 The power imbalance 
between American and Canadian Jewish organizational life that shaped the con-
tours of bilateral communal relations throughout the twentieth century was recast 
in Cuba. Spearheaded by the CJC, Canadian Jewish institutional involvement in Cuba 
since the 1960s challenges the misconception of Canadian Jewry as inconsequential 
on the global stage.7 
Little attention has been paid to this important episode with a particular emphasis 
on Canadian Jewish institutional involvement. While Robert M. Levine’s 1993 land-
mark publication, Tropical Diaspora: The Jewish Experience in Cuba, served as the in-
spiration for deeper research into this historical episode, this paper is distinguished 
by an emphasis on the organizational and institutional features of Canadian Jewish 
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involvement in Cuba. Accordingly, in the entirety of Tropical Diaspora the CJC is ref-
erenced barely over a dozen times, the overwhelming majority of which is found in 
the bibliography. Levine’s treatment of the subject is rather terse:
Throughout the Castro period, the major responsibility for looking after the 
needs of the Cuban Jewish community fell to the World Jewish Congress, main-
ly through its Canadian affiliate, the Canadian Jewish Congress. Canada never 
broke diplomatic relations with Cuba; as a result, communications remained 
open, and Canadians were not required to obtain visas to enter the country.8
Such sparseness is extended to the major actors involved. Core individuals such as 
Ben Kayfetz are cited in the endnotes while left unnamed in the book as an “Ashke-
nazic Jew.” A deeper examination of the CJC is eschewed in Tropical Diaspora for a 
deeper commentary of everyday Cuban Jewish life.
This paper will focus on the centrality of Canadian Jewry’s institutional role in Cuba 
beginning in the 1960s, exploring in greater detail and specificity the personalities, 
organizational dynamics, as well as geopolitical considerations the CJC navigated. 
The correspondence and deeds of men such as Ben Kayfetz, Saul Hayes, and Samuel 
Lewin are vital in reclaiming this forgotten chapter of Canadian Jewish activism.
The Beginnings of the Cuban Jewish Community
The Cuban Jewish community emerged between the nation’s independence from 
Spain in 1898 and the American occupation shortly thereafter.9 Despite the imposi-
tion of a vassal-like status under the United States following the passage of the Platt 
Amendment in 1901, Cuba boasted of “an open-door immigration policy” since its 
earliest years of independence. This reputation attracted Jewish immigration from 
the United States, the Ottoman Empire, and later on, Eastern Europe.10 Professor 
Margalit Bejarano identified two distinct waves of Jewish immigration to Cuba: the 
first beginning in 1902 culminating at the peak of the sugar industry’s expansion in 
1920 and, the second, spanning the American Quota Act of 1921 to the beginning of 
the Second World War.11 
The initial wave of Jewish immigration overlapped with the flourishing domestic 
sugar industry, drawing Jewish businessmen from the United States and Sephardic 
Jews from the Ottoman Empire.12 The former integrated both culturally and eco-
nomically well within the fabric of Cuban life. The Sephardic milieu eased com-
munal assimilation given their ability to speak Ladino (Judeo-Spanish).13 Population 
figures of the community presented by Professor Judith Laikin Elkin suggests that 
from 1902 to 1914, 5,700 Jews immigrated to Cuba.14 The American Quota Act of 1921 
and the Johnson Reed Act of 1924 spurred a subsequent wave of Jewish immigration. 
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This movement was largely comprised of Eastern European Jewish émigrés, speak-
ing a mix of Russian, Polish, and Yiddish.15 Designed to “rebalance” ethnic immigra-
tion to the United States, the Quota Acts catalyzed immigration from countries other 
than Southern and Eastern Europe (i.e., Italians, Poles, Russians, Austro-Hungarians). 
Despite its intent of promoting immigration from Northern and Western Europe 
(i.e., British, German, Irish, and Scandinavia), the legislation stipulated that one year 
of residency in the Western Hemisphere conferred exemption from the quota, thus 
making counties such as Cuba an ideal haven for short-term transit migration ulti-
mately destined for America.16 Such calculations encouraged Eastern European Jews 
to immigrate to Cuba as a stepping stone.17 However, the onset of the Great Depres-
sion in 1929 led to the curbing of America’s immigration policies, precipitating new 
Jewish arrivals to plant roots and settle in Cuba.18  
In many respects, the Cuban Jewish community was better integrated within the 
larger, national fold than amongst coreligionists themselves. The internal dynam-
ics of the community, namely its cultural diversity, at times encouraged division. 
Such a communal rift cut along ethnic lines between the Sephardic-Turkish Jews 
and Ashkenazim hailing from Eastern European. While the former was a close-knit 
society, striving to preserve its religious traditions, as Zhava Litvac Glaser reflected, 
the latter lacked a leading communal personality and openly regarded themselves as 
transients.19 “The various Cuban Jewish communities, while forming their own soci-
eties for mutual benefit purposes, did not generally associate or cooperate,” Glaser’s 
writes in her dissertation. “The Sephardim and Ashkenazim continually found fault 
with one another.”20 Geographically, too, the communities were separated. Whereas 
Ashkenazi Jews concentrated in Havana, Sephardic communities generally dispersed 
throughout Cuba, many as itinerant peddlers in small pueblos in the countryside.21 
Despite the temporary, transient nature many Jews envisioned their Cuban stay to 
be, the country proved itself to be accommodating, enabling communal culture 
to flourish. Indeed, antisemitism had never been a particularly pronounced phe-
nomenon in Cuba. Religious antisemitism was less potent on the island given the 
combined absence of religious fanaticism and a historical Cuban Jewish presence. 
Such dynamics “contributed to the disconnection of the chain of antisemitism that 
continued to exist in Europe,” Professor Bejarano writes.22 As Jacobo Laufer, a native 
Cuban whose parents immigrated a few years prior to his birth recalled of his child-
hood, “As a young boy, playing ball, fighting with the other children of the neigh-
bourhood, religion was never an issue when interacting socially.” Cuba left such an 
indelible mark on Jewish immigrants that, years later, many continued to reminisce 
about “akhsanie Kuba” (hotel Cuba) even after their arrival in the United States.23 
One notable exception punctuates Cuba’s reputation as a haven for Jews. The S.S. St. 
Louis, filled with European Jews escaping the unfolding theatre of the Final Solution 
were barred entry in Cuba.24 Popularized as “The Voyage of the Damned,” the ordeal 
epitomized the institutional failure of North American Jewry to mobilize and save 
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Jewish lives in a time of crisis.25 Despite the incident, Professor Robert M. Levine 
maintains, “Cuba’s overall record in permitting Jewish refugees to enter was among 
the best in the world.”26 
Thus Cuba on the eve of revolution was a far more tolerant, pluralistic, and promis-
ing country for new Jewish arrivals than the lands from which most fled.27
The Flashpoint
Cuban Jewish life by the 1950s was a mix of political repression and economic 
prosperity ushered in under the auspices of the military dictatorship of Fulgen-
cio Batista (1952–1958).28 As a result, Professor Bejarano writes, the pre-revolution 
years witnessed the coalescing of the once-dispersed Sephardi community into 
cities congregating closer to commerce and industry. Nor did political consider-
ations weigh heavily upon Cuban Jewry at the time. Still integrating into Cuban 
society more broadly, only a minority of Cuban Jews—mostly second-generation 
offspring—pursued higher education and liberal professions. Accordingly, prior to 
Castro’s communist revolution, the community was neither politically mobilized nor 
overwhelmingly active within revolutionary underground political circles. For the 
small cohort that subscribed to radical politics, Batista’s suppression of the Cuban 
Communist Party coupled with the Soviet Union’s increased hostility towards Soviet 
Jewry eroded any communal beachhead that temporarily existed.29
Although sidelined from the political undercurrents roiling pre-revolutionary 
Cuba, the Jewish community benefited greatly from the era’s economic mobili-
ty. “Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Cuba’s Jews, riding the crest of the economic 
boom, on the whole continued to live in their own world,” Professor Levine writes.30 
During these decades, a Cuban Jewish nouvelle richesse emerged. Nonetheless, such 
progress was constrained as prestigious clubs and social groups within the broader 
national fabric remained unwelcoming to the community.31
Despite such progress, as Levine writes, growing public clamour against well-known 
problems of graft, corruption, and predatory foreign direct investment under the 
Batista regime escalated in the late-1950s. The latter points weighed heavily upon 
the minds of Cubans. Core economic national assets—resorts, petroleum, industries, 
and public utilities—overwhelmingly exported wealth to foreign shores depriving 
the nation of vital revenue. The asymmetric relationship between Cuba and Unit-
ed States was on full display in the economic arena. “The only foreign investments 
of importance are those of the United States. American participation [ownership] 
exceeds 90 per cent of telephone and electric services, about 50 per cent in public 
service railways, and roughly 40 per cent in raw sugar production,” a 1956 American 
Department of Commerce survey reported.32 
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Fidel Castro captured the discontent of many Cubans summarizing the need for 
political revolution by harkening back to the country’s history as an imperial pos-
session.33 “The Republic was not freed in 1895 and the dream was frustrated at the last 
minute. The revolution did not take place in 1933 and was frustrated by its enemies. 
However, this time the revolution is backed by the mass of the people, and has all the 
revolutionaries behind it.”34 The upheaval placed Cuban Jewry in a particularly awk-
ward position. Though sympathetic to the causes of social justice, Castro’s assault on 
pre-revolutionary Cuba, termed the “neocolonial era,” was deeply unsettling. Those 
successful during this time, disproportionately among them Cuban Jews, came to be 
called lackeys of international capitalists.35
Such rhetoric less than a hundred miles from the mainland United States did lit-
tle to assuage fears. Bilateral relations unravelled following the overthrow of Ba-
tista on 1 January 1959. Among Castro’s first acts in reasserting Cuban sovereignty 
was the nationalization of American property holdings without compensation. The 
precipitous deterioration in Cuban-American ties devolved into a vicious cycle of 
tit-for-tat. America applied retaliatory economic sanctions, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) sponsored Cuban exiles to depose Castro, and the United States strove 
to isolate Cuba within international forums such as the Organization of American 
States (OAS).36 
Increasingly apprehensive amid countless failed assassination plots and American 
attempts to undermine the political regime internationally, Castro accepted the con-
struction of Soviet nuclear facilities in early-1962. Revelations of these sites led to 
an American blockade and activation of Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) 
2 protocols entailing preparations for imminent nuclear war.37 Popularly known as 
the moment which brought the world closest “to the brink of nuclear disaster,” the 
Cuban Missile Crisis was eventually resolved diplomatically, though the incident il-
luminated the divergent foreign policy approaches between the U.S. and Canada 
during the early stages of the Cold War.38
Historically, Canadians were largely sympathetic to Cuban grievances and Castro’s 
nationalist economic policies. The tropes of American economic and political domi-
nance over Cuba reminded many Canadians of the overbearing and stifling existence 
living beside a world superpower had upon domestic political discussion of national 
autonomy. Capturing this sentiment, historian Jocelyn Maynard Ghent reiterated 
how, “many Canadians also felt they shared with Cuba the status of economic satellite 
to American industry. Hence, they tended to view Castro’s expropriation of United 
States property as the ‘legitimate efforts of a small economy to free itself from ex-
cessive foreign influence.’”39 Similarly, the United States’ punitive trade war aroused 
Canadian denunciation. A Globe and Mail article entitled “Cuba and the OAS Reso-
lution,” echoed the common fears felt by many Canadians. Condemning America’s 
successful campaign to expel Cuba from the OAS, the article exclaimed that the epi-
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sode had “provided the world with a working demonstration of U.S. colonialism: how 
many of the states which voted with the United States are heavily dependent upon 
U.S. aid?”40 Maintaining ties with Cuba, many Canadians believed, was an assertion 
of national independence. 
Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker remained critical of “American emo-
tionalism” over Cuba, asserting that the United States’ unwavering stance supporting 
policies of Cuban isolation only accelerated Cuba’s departure to the Eastern Bloc.41 
These views were repeated in a December 1960 Globe and Mail article in response to 
the American embargo of Cuba. “The U.S. embargo, in our view and in the view of 
many people south of the border, is a mistaken strategy. If Cuba cannot obtain from 
the free world the goods she requires to live, she will certainly turn to Russia . . . and 
be driven even deeper into the Communist embrace.”42
Diefenbaker’s single decision to maintain normal ties with Cuba permitted the CJC 
to operate in an environment in which no Americans, and by extension American 
Jews, could operate within. Consequently, the discrepancy in national foreign pol-
icies between Canada and the United States precluded the JDC from partaking in 
Cuban Jewish affairs, while Canada, unhindered by such political considerations, en-
abled the CJC to remain active. As such, the JDC and the CJC evoke the imagery of 
passengers strapped into their respective national cars. Only by virtue of the Amer-
ican government’s departure from Cuba, did the JDC become ineffectual and thus 
the CJC indispensable. 
Snowbirds Spotted in Cuba
The deterioration of Cuban-American ties was met instantaneously with executive 
action on the part of the JDC’s Executive Vice Chairman, Moses A. Leavitt, rerouting 
organizational responsibilities to the CJC in March 1961.43 The task, as the first CJC 
fact-finding representative Joseph Kage, then the National Executive Director of 
the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada (JIAS), discovered in a debriefing with 
Leavitt was daunting. A passage from Kage’s account of the conversation illustrates 
the breath of issuing confronting the Cuban Jewish community at the time. Report-
ing back to the CJC after the meeting, Kage maintained, “The opinion of Mr. Leavitt 
appeared to indicate that unless the Jewish community of Cuba can mobilize its own 
forces to conduct and be responsible for whatever welfare programme they need, 
immigration included, the work of outside agencies in trying to help them would 
have a limited efficiency. By the same token, should the Jewish community of Cuba 
organize itself, then the facilities of the U.H.S. [United HIAS Service], the A.J.D.C. 
[American Joint Distribution Committee], etc. could be utilized effectively in various 
phases of communal needs, immigration, relief activities, etc.”44 
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Such demands touched core aspects of Cuban daily life. From emigration and re-
ligious supplies to economic sustainability, none of these pressing issues could be 
explored nor resolved without the cooperation and express permission of both the 
Canadian and Cuban governments. Accordingly, the CJC had to preserve a delicate 
balance between Canada and Cuba as well as Castro’s own perception of a foreign 
interest group intervening in domestic affairs. If managed improperly, the CJC could 
find itself barred from the island for veering too close to political activism or per-
ceived subversion jeopardizing the mission.45 Saul Hayes, the Executive Vice-Pres-
ident of the CJC, took pre-emptive steps to ensure full transparency informing the 
Canadian Department of External Affairs in early-1961 of the organization’s presence 
and purpose in Cuba. Equally fearful of the perception of interfering in Canadian 
foreign policy or undermining bilateral relations, Hayes reiterated to the Consular 
Division in the External Affairs Department prior to Kage’s departure in March 1961:
It is obvious, but I nevertheless state it, that Mr. Kage has strict instructions not 
to discuss matters of the policy of the Cuban Government, nor to intervene even 
in the slightest way in these matters, since it is not our concern in the slightest 
and our mission is solely in the Jewish social welfare and communal organiza-
tional field.46 
Aware that any misstep in Cuba could endanger the mission’s sustainability, the CJC 
consistently stressed its apolitical, nonpartisan role in assisting the Cuban Jewish 
community. 
Kage’s twenty-four-page report spanned daily meetings with community leaders 
and synagogues, to conversations with Canadian diplomats, and even the state of 
the local Jewish education system. According to Kage, at a meeting of the Sephardic 
community in the newly rebuilt synagogue Union Hebrea Chevet Ahim, “I brought 
greetings from Canada, told them briefly about the [Canadian] community, about the 
purpose of my visit and also touched on the various current issues.”47 Kage continued, 
“The bulk of the evening was related to the question period and as a group they were 
much less guarded in their questions as well as remarks pertaining to the specific is-
sues of immigration, movement of the children, etc.”48 Although the questions would 
change in the years to come—following the flight of the vast majority of Cuban 
Jewry –a consistent theme throughout the CJC’s involvement in Cuba to explore the 
existing condition of the community, and secondly, to prioritize the needs, demands, 
and relief they required. 
Among Kage’s prospective initiatives was to amalgamate the approximately nine 
communal Cuban Jewish agencies under an umbrella organization: 
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The attitude towards the setting up of an overall communal body was fully ex-
plained above in this report. I personally feel the establishment of such a body 
is not only desirable from the point of view of communal organization, but is 
almost a must to meet the exigencies and contingencies of the time. I have also 
reason to believe that the majority of the population and the leadership of the 
various organizations would not oppose this move.49 
Meeting with community leaders, Kage discerned a desire for unifying disparate 
organizations. Diagnosing the situation, Kage concluded, “Therefore, such a relief 
programme might be of an evolving nature and may encompass certain aspects such 
as religious needs, some Jewish educational needs, immigration aid, resettlement 
help, and help in the economic readjustment of those who will stay.”50 Kage report 
illustrated the importance such primary research gleaned from the Cuban Jewish 
community situation and wellbeing serving a roadmap upon which future missions 
would emulate. 
The most telling feature of Kage’s report of March 1961 was that it was sent from 
the CJC to the JDC. Although at face value, it may be overlooked as a mere record 
of correspondence, the circuit by which information and intelligence on the Cuban 
Jewish community flowed is important and symbolic in understanding the changing 
intra-diasporic relationship. In retrospect, it was remarkable that a representative 
of the CJC (i.e., Kage) was notifying one of the major American Jewish institutions 
and, more broadly, international diasporic life, of the developments mere miles from 
American shores.51 
The Kage report is equally surprising in what it omits. Kage expounded little upon 
the community’s economic condition or size in the wake of mass emigration. In 
actuality, the CJC inherited a situation far from ideal in Cuba. On the eve of Kage’s 
mission in 1961, nearly half of the 12,000-member Cuban Jewish community had left. 
Unlike earlier historical examples of Jewish migration in which antisemitism played 
a central role, in Castroist Cuba it was noticeably absent. According to Cuban Jewish 
Historian Dana Evan Kaplan:
Scholars have stressed that the Jews who left did not do so because they felt they 
had to flee religious persecution. Rather, they wanted to escape from a socialist 
or communist economic system that had confiscated their businesses and would 
not allow them the economic latitude they needed in order to fulfill their eco-
nomic aspirations.52
Correspondingly, the emigres disproportionately came from the middle- and up-
per-classes. The growing absence of the latter, particularly, remained a pressing 
concern raised repeatedly in subsequent CJC missions and hindered the communi-
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ty’s recovery in later years. Thus, and in increasing proportion in the years to come, 
the remaining Cuban Jewish community was largely comprised of the socio-eco-
nomically disadvantaged, the elderly, and the infirm. 
Such realities were echoed by fellow CJC representative Samuel Lewin’s mission 
three months later. Revisiting the core issues set forth by Kage, Lewin concluded 
that the situation remained urgent. Community organizations had been unable to 
unify as Kage earlier suggested. According to Lewin, “Local organizations and syna-
gogues are in a state of almost total disintegration. The leaders and the bulk of active 
membership have left.”53 The two sole Jewish day schools had been nationalized, “and 
there are no facilities whatsoever for any kind of Jewish Education.”54 Dedicating 
himself to the most immediate problem, Lewin’s report is largely directed toward 
facilitating emigration.55 
Why Stay?
Following the revolution, emigration remained the leading concern for CJC and JDC 
representatives. The community of 12,000 on the eve of revolution, had by the time 
of Samuel Lewin’s visit in June 1961, dwindled rapidly. Lewin estimated that “over 50% 
left the country already. There is a literal exodus from Cuba.”56 Kage’s report two-
months prior reached a similar conclusion. “There is no question that there is, and 
is likely to continue to be, a demand for immigration and resettlement.”57 Fearful of 
the deteriorating political and economic climate, as early as September 1960, 3,000 
Jews had emigrated from Cuba, comprising between one quarter to one third of the 
overall community, overwhelmingly bound for the United States.58 
In Samuel Lewin’s estimation, Cuba had been a “paradise” for Jews prior to the Cas-
tro Revolution. “It is only the change of regime and the introduction of Communism 
and all which it entails that cause the mass movement.”59 According to Cuban émigré 
Ruth Behar, for Ashkenazi Jews in Cuba, Castro’s embrace of communism harkened 
back to painful memories of the Russian Revolution and the deleterious conse-
quences nationalization of education and state interference in the family brought.60 
Such fears were confirmed following another CJC mission conducted in October 
1962 by Ben Kayfetz, the National Director of Community Relations, which revealed 
troubling patterns.61 According to Kayfetz, Cuban Jews often bickered about Castro 
and the regime. “I hadn’t opened a conversation of more than a few words privately 
either in a house or in the privacy of the synagogue when anyone I met told me quite 
openly about the terror of the regime, the ruination which has failed upon the coun-
try as a whole, and the brutal nature of the communist regime.”62 Kayfetz’s report 
provides valuable insight into the increasingly repressive and authoritarian character 
of the Castro regime. “I was told of a case of a person who received a gift of bananas 
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from a friend. It was found that this gift of bananas exceeded the permissible limit 
of 25 pounds,” Kayfetz reported. “This person was put into prison for six months and 
his Mercedes Benz was confiscated.”63 Kayfetz also noted the imprisonment of sev-
enty-two Jews for currency crimes. “This is one of the most serious offences next to 
political crimes and once you are caught there seems to be no way out of it.”64 
Like all Cubans, Jews had to also contend with property nationalization and ruin-
ous economic policies. By the time of Lewin’s mission in June 1961, “two Jewish Day 
Schools” had been nationalized.65 According to Kayfetz, by 1962 “It was not only a 
question of having spoken to persons of the middleclass bourgeois origin who had 
been expropriated and regretted the loss of their holdings. I spoke to persons who 
were in no way effected by the regime as, for instance, the president of Adas Israel 
who is an old-fashioned traditional Jew and whose trade—watchmaking—was not 
restricted. What these people are distressed by (to use a mild word) is the constant 
terror, the uncertainty, the informing or as they use the Hebrew word — ‘m’seer-
ah’—that goes on.”66 A typical emigrant’s experience was covered in The Globe and 
Mail in January 1961. A jeweller by trade, the man “left because he was forced to pay 
for imported jewels in hard currency, while the Cuban money he received for them 
was practically worthless.”67 Leaving Cuba because of its “shaky economics,” the man 
resettled in Canada.68 
The progressively restrictive emigration policies further complicated matters. Upon 
Kayfetz’s arrival in October 1962, the practice had become extremely complex. “The 
process of applying for exit is a very painful and tortuous one. Once [the] application 
is made, the officials come to your home and take inventory of every single item you 
have in your home,” Kayfetz wrote. “People applying for departure have even been 
known to purchase items of furniture and household appliances which they didn’t 
have because they would be suspected, if these things were absent, of having delib-
erately sold them prior to making application to leave.”69 These initial CJC-sponsored 
missions implicitly concluded that the economic policies implemented as well the dic-
tatorial undercurrents of the Castro regime were the key drivers of Jewish emigration. 
Nonetheless, religion discrimination was seldom reported. As Kayfetz reported in 
1962, “All the Jews I spoke to, even those who are most bitter about their experiences 
and about what happened to them, concluded they are not suffering any special dis-
abilities as Jews, but they share the loss of Cubans in general which, of course, itself 
is bad enough.”70 It was more an issue of class, for which a Jewish community overly 
represented in the middle and upper echelons of society were more responsive to. In 
the words of Joseph Kage, “Representing a largely middle class element, the Jewish 
community may perhaps suffer to a greater degree from any trends of business cur-
tailment, etc.”71 Nevertheless, Jews were but a part of the hundreds-of-thousands of 
well-to-do Cubans partaking in “a massive exodus” from the island.72 
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Leaving Akhsanie Kuba 
During the earliest stages of the CJC’s involvement in Cuba, the aspect of immigra-
tion that proved to be the most troublesome was logistical, not political. An internal 
memorandum from the JDC in March 1961 cited that, “the biggest problem in em-
igration from Cuba is the serious limitation in transportation facilities.”73 Similarly, 
Joseph Kage noted the absence of political obstacles upon his return from Cuba a 
month later. Reiterating Castro’s earlier comments upon hearing the news that a 
former supporter’s wife and daughter sought asylum in Costa Rica, Kage reported, 
“The policy of the Revolutionary Government is to let anyone leave Cuba who wants 
to go.”74 Moreover, “It is also clear that the number of people who have left Cuba to 
date, children included, have left with the full knowledge of the Cuban authorities 
because they had passports and exit permits.”75 Samuel Lewin encountered a similar 
experience two months later writing, “There are no restrictions whatsoever on em-
igration. The Government put itself openly on record as being anxious to get rid of 
all ‘treacherous’ and ‘undesirable’ elements.”76 
Given the transportation limitations, the JDC reported in March 1961 that HIAS, 
the principal body working on behalf of Cuban Jewry to assist in their emigration, 
“hopes to have a representative in Cuba if they can find someone with a Canadian or 
South American passport to serve in that capacity.”77 The lack of an American Jewish 
representative or organization prior required an immediate remedy. The obvious 
choice favoured the Canadians. According to CJC member Jack Silverstone, Canada 
had “a rather good relationship [with Cuba] compared to the Americans.”78 Capable 
of visiting and conducting business, geographically proximate, and sharing a good 
working relationship with the JDC, the conditions were aligned in favour of Cana-
dian Jewry.79 
The purpose, then, of Samuel Lewin’s mission of June 1961, was “to inquire into the 
possibilities; to assist in the arrangements; and to set up HIAS operations on a con-
tinuing basis.”80 Unlike Kage, who set about meeting community leaders and inves-
tigating the state-of-affairs of Cuban Jewry, Lewin’s primary objective was under-
standing the emigration issue.81 Commercial airplanes, according to Lewin, appeared 
to be among the most popular modes of emigration but also severely backlogged. 
“Transportation is practically impossible at the present, as all flights are booked up 
to the end of the year.”82 With air transport effectively crippled to year’s end, other 
alternatives emerged including a transportation black market. 
Lewin connected with both the Israeli Consular General and the Canadian Ambassa-
dor to Cuba to explore the possibilities of immigration and resettlement. While the 
former was cooperative and proactive, the latter remained noncommittal. “He did 
not think the Government in Ottawa would make special provisions for Jewish cases 
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in Havana,” Lewis reported of the Canadian Vice Consul.83 Lewin spoke at length with 
the Canadian Ambassador and the interim Charge d’Affaires. 
Both were very cordial and interested in the reaction of the “Jewish colony.” 
I was told that since January the Canadian Embassy had up to 1,500 applica-
tions for tourist visas to Canada and refused them all, as they did not think 
the applicants were bona fide tourists and suspected they wanted to come to 
Canada to just wait for a U.S.A. visa.84 
With or without official help, Cuban Jews were leaving. By the time of Kayfetz’s trip 
in October 1962, an estimated 80% of the community had left. In Kayfetz’s words, 
“The Jewish population has, of course, almost in a literal sense been decimated.”85 
Kayfetz identified two chief reasons “inhibiting persons from leaving.” Foremost 
were the economic costs associated with emigration. “These persons simply can-
not face the prospect of winding up as penniless refugees in a new country at their 
age, sans means and as a burden either on the community or on their children who 
themselves are also refugees.”86 Secondly, there was an expectation that better days 
were ahead. “There was a general feeling that tension could not last, that there would 
have to be a showdown in the political and international crisis and that this crisis 
would likely occur around New Year.”87 
Kage, Lewin, and Kayfetz’s accounts further reveal the rapid change in protocols 
enacted by the Castro regime to severely curtail emigration. Gone were the libertar-
ian days of government rhetoric permitting any desiring individuals to leave Cuba 
as Kage and Lewin’s earlier visits documented. By the time of Kayfetz’s mission less 
than a year-and-a-half later, he reported back that Cuban officials would visit a 
prospective emigrant’s house and inventory their belongings to ensure they did not 
sell their possessions prior to departing. “A man who had an empty grandfather clock 
frame went to buy a clock to put in it to avoid this kind of suspicion. A man who had 
a broken-down old car had it repaired at a cost of 200 pesos because otherwise he 
would have been accused of deliberately sabotaging his car.”88 
The progressive emptying of Cuba’s Jewish community throughout the 1960s led 
to an organizational rebalancing of priorities. For the vulnerable, remaining Cuban 
Jews less emphasis was to be placed on expediting emigration as opposed to allevi-
ating the community’s economic and religious exigencies. A 1967 mission sponsored 
at the behest of the JDC directing HIAS Argentina Branch representative Marek 
Schindelman to serve on its behalf in Cuba illustrates grave condition of Cuban Jew-
ry.89 Remarkably absent from Schindelman’s plea is a demand for aid on the emi-
gration front. “It is disastrous—the rich have left, some having foreseen the situation 
have sent part of their disposable funds out of the country, but these are few. Most of 
them have left real assets, houses, apartments—with all their furniture, objects of all 
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kinds, including art—businesses, cars, etc.”90 Schindelman concluded:
Help is needed immediately and at all cost! Today perhaps it is feasible, to-
morrow perhaps it will be too late! Let us do all that is humanly possible on 
behalf of those unfortunate condemned to live in the convulsive Cuba. This 
is reported to you by one who spent ten days of hell and has not yet been 
able to recuperate.91 
Accordingly, by the mid-1960s the CJC’s role in Cuba began shifting away from a 
concern of emigration and resettlement. A letter from James P. Rice, President of 
the United HIAS Service, addressed to Richard Mayer, a lay leader from Madrid, 
outlined an agreement with the National Bank of Cuba whereby the Standing Con-
ference of European Jewish Community Services could send monthly payments to be 
disbursed to the Cuban Jewish community.92 The CJC’s mission, according to HIAS, 
moving forward, would eschew its earlier emphasis on procuring transportation, 
exit permits, or coordination with the Cuban government. Henceforth, such issues 
would be the purview of HIAS.93 Thus, in the decades to come, the CJC’s operational 
imperative was increasingly financial seeking to alleviate the cascading impact the 
community’s economic vulnerability confronting Cuban Jewry. 
Financial Straits
The economic plight, long a struggle for Cuban Jewish institutional life, was only ex-
acerbated following the 1959 revolution.94 With the departure of roughly four fifths 
of the community by 1962, Cuban Jews became increasingly dependent on foreign 
donations and aid. The CJC’s Saul Meyer sent Astorre Mayer of the Standing Con-
ference of European Jewish Community Services a letter entitled, “Aid to Needy Jews 
in Cuba.” The Conference had received several urgent appeals from, “at least 250 
aged, sick and destitute Jewish people in Cuba who, after having sold practically all 
their belongings, are now threatened with starvation.”95 Now, having secured the 
funding from European institutions, the Conference sought to enlist the CJC’s co-
operation “in this project of aid to the Jewish people in Cuba.”96 The conventional 
means by which dues and income were collected in the Cuban Jewish community 
had all but evaporated with mass emigration. On the subject of financing, Kayfetz’s 1962 
report rhetorically asked, “How are these committees financed?”97 The Patronato, the 
largest Cuban Jewish institution, had been running monthly deficits of 1,500 pesos and 
was compelled to seek funding by which time only 200 pesos remained in its treasury.98 
While primary stewardship had been transferred to the CJC, in terms of interna-
tional financial support, the Council of European Jewish Communities spearhead-
ed fundraising. With complications arising from the political climate in Cuba, the 
Council by “special arrangement” had donated $18,000 annually to the community.99 
56
Ari Blaff / Snowbirds Spotted in Cuba: 
Canadian Jewish Congress on The Global Stage in the 1960s
Although the CJC did not lead the financial campaign, as a later CJC-sponsored 
mission chaired by Lavy Becker in 1971 illustrated, once more, the organization’s 
indispensable role in Cuba providing essential information for international de-
cision-making.100 Becker’s trip updated the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the 
Council of European Jewish Communities to the prevailing conditions in Cuba as 
well as the Jewish community’s needs. For instance, Becker chronicled the wide-
spread impoverishment of Cuban Jewry. “The poor,” Becker reported accounted for, 
“some 175 [people], approximately 12% of the community. They undoubtedly include 
not only those who were poor earners before the revolution, but also those whose lot 
was aggravated by the changed economy, as well as those who aged sufficiently to be 
affected by the change.”101 That more than a tenth of the Cuban Jewish community 
was dependent upon financial aid led Becker to conclude, “We will need to continue 
to support them financially and morally.”102 
Generally speaking, the economic circumstances of the Cuban Jewish community 
from the mid-1960s onward was as an unmitigated disaster. All the major communal 
institutions were financially dependent or economically unstable. The departure of 
roughly a further quarter of the population between 1962 and 1973 exacerbated the 
already struggling community’s reliance on membership fees. Consequently, Cana-
dian, American, and European Jewish organization contemplated various means of 
addressing the dual problems of Cuban Jewry, and its institutions, economic pre-
cariousness. One was found in an unusual place with the annual Passover shipments 
spearheaded by the CJC. In years to come, such seemingly innocuous goods would 
become the major lifeline of economic sustainability for the community. Distrib-
uted to the local synagogues, the supplies which included “matzos, horseradish, tea, 
chicken loaf, and ceremonial wine,” were then resold to Jews registered on the Pass-
over list.103 The resulting income would then deposited into a community welfare 
fund and, in Kayfetz’s opinion, amounted to the “main source of revenue to maintain 
the Jewish institutions.”104
Passover in Havana                                                                                                              
Following the Second World War, the distribution of Passover supplies, especially to 
European Jews in displaced person (DP) camps, gained new symbolic meaning for 
the diaspora. A 1950 news bulletin from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) captures 
the sentiment. “The Passover holiday, which begins April 1, will this year be marked 
by thousands of Jews in DP camps and in J.D.C. transient centres, waiting to re-enact 
the Biblical story of the Exodus from Egypt.”105 In the case of the Cuban Revolution 
nearly a decade later, North American Jewry’s concerns were intensified by Cuba’s 
progressive departure toward the Soviet sphere of influence.106 Passover, requiring a 
strict dietary regimen, ensured Cuban Jewry’s utter dependence on foreign supply, 
thus became a principal concern of the CJC.107 
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Even prior to the severing of American—Cuban relations, the Comunidad Religiosa 
Hebrea De Cuba (Adath Israel) notified HIAS of their alarming situation. The ab-
sence of matzos, “is not merely a religious problem, but a general Jewish problem, 
because our community is being made gradually to appear just like the general pop-
ulation.”108 The rationing of food had left all Cubans, according to Ben Kayfetz, in “a 
very bad” situation.109 Further compounding Cuban Jewry’s “food situation” was the 
chronic unavailability of kosher food, religious products, and a shochet (an overseer 
of kosher food production).110 The timing of the American—Cuban split in January 
1961, and the arrival of Passover in early April, was unpropitious.111 By the time of 
Kage’s visit he reported, “With reference to the matzos, I was asked to transmit to 
the Canadian Jewish Congress and the A.J.D.C. the deep appreciation of the Adath 
Israel for this gift which for them, and probably for many other members of the 
community, is of great significance.”112 The importance of the issue was resounded in 
a WJC announcement on March 21, 1961, entitled, “Cuban Jewry Will Have Passover 
Supplies.”113 In the press release the WJC explicitly acknowledged, “Another World 
Jewish Congress affiliate, the Canadian Jewish Congress, has undertaken to ship the 
Passover supplies as part of its relief program in cooperation with the Joint Distri-
bution Committee.”114 
Lavy Becker’s 1973 report illustrates both the significance Cuban Jewry assigned to 
the CJC’s transferring of Passover supplies as well as how consuming the initiative 
had become for the organization’s activities. Appended to Becker’s initial report was 
a detailed account dedicated to “the distribution of Passover products to Jews of 
Cuba as learned on a visit to Cuba from January 29 to February 2, 1973.”115 Becker’s 
report is three pages of minute detail on the CJC’s operation:
In accordance with their decision each Jewish family is entitled to receive the 
following: Matzah—4 pounds per person, Matzah Meal—2 pounds per person, 
Meat—3 tins a person, Oil—1/10 gallon per person, and Wine—1 bottle for fam-
ilies of less than 4 persons and 2 bottles for families of between 5 and 8.
Becker further parses the minutia by its corresponding distribution among the 
principal organizational benefactors in Cuba, such as the Adath Israel Congregation, 
the Centro Hebrea Sefaradi (the Sephardi synagogue), and the Union Sionista.116 Ben 
Kayfetz’s subsequent 1985 mission similarly enumerated the importance of supply, 
distribution, and coordination of the annual Passover donation. According to Kay-
fetz, “The annual shipment from Canada has been the only source of Passover food 
for this isolated community since it was cut off from USA trade [sic] by the American 
embargo after the Castro uprising.”117
Despite the CJC’s early fears of an uncooperative (or even wholly obstructionist) 
Cuban government, Becker’s 1975 report spoke glowingly of their cooperation. “The 
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role of the Cuban government, active and passive, in its relationship to the Jewish 
community is so unusual as to deserve not only recording, but the gratitude of Jews 
everywhere.”118 “The Cuban government allowed the Jewish community a special 
license to receive the rather large quantity of Passover foods. It was a concession 
towards their religious requirements,” Becker reported.119 More broadly, Cuban so-
ciety remained supportive of the Jewish community and saw them as fellow citizens 
who similarly “endured the discomforts of other middle-class Cubans.” Remarkably, 
during this time even the Cuban media depicted Passover as a celebration of na-
tional liberation.120 According to Donna Katzin, a correspondent for The Nation, who 
conducted a study in Cuba of the Jewish community in 1974 concluded, “it is all too 
easy to assume Cuba, which receives much aid from the USSR, must follow parallel 
policies. But the Cuban Jewish community itself testifies that the island’s Socialist 
economic and political reorganization neither discourages religious observance nor 
tolerates antisemitism.”121  
If the CJC had played the role of “observe and report” on emigration in later decades, 
the organization had served dutifully as the point person for the religious supplies 
initiative. It is remarkable the extent, perhaps even fixation, with which the CJC, JDC, 
and HIAS remained constantly aware of the status of religious supplies in Cuba. The 
CJC’s fact-finding missions to Cuba, repeatedly reference the issue alongside what, 
to an outside observer, would appear to be far more pressing concerns: antisemitism, 
Israel, religious freedom, emigration, and the standard of living. As such, the issue 
of religious supplies in this context ought not to be considered subordinate to those 
of seemingly vital significance. As Lavy Becker asserted following his fact-finding 
mission in 1973:
One cannot overemphasize the importance to Cuban Jews of this great gift 
[Passover supplies]. It is not only that in a land of shortages extra food items are 
especially welcome. It is that these foods help them observe the Festival of Free-
dom. But of greatest importance is that they know that they are not forgotten, 
that people care.122 
The tradition has continued unabated to the modern day, and the spirit and rhetoric 
behind the CJC remain largely the same. Revealing the continued significance of this 
annual tradition, Len Rudner, a former member of the CJC, recounted in an email 
correspondence that although the mission originated well before his tenure:
. . . certainly the sense that I had was that [the] CJC and the [Canadian] Jewish com-
munity engaged in this decades-long effort because of a strong sense of commu-
nal responsibility. I don’t think I ever heard of anyone say that we were doing this 
because the Americans weren’t. Rather, it was because it was the right thing to do. 
As the Passover Haggadah says, “let those who are hungry come to eat.”123
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Rudner’s explanation captures the essence of the Passover holiday in Jewish tradi-
tion. Reflecting on the organization’s commitments which began in Cuba in 1961, 
the then-CJC CEO Bernie Farber wrote in 2011, “There is a centuries-old custom, 
known as Maot Chitim, whereby Jews gathered wheat to provide the poor with matzo 
and other items for the observance of Passover.” Farber continued:
That’s why, when the Joint Distribution Committee, an international Jewish aid 
agency, approached the Canadian Jewish Community to help Cuba’s Jews. Ben 
Kayfetz, the lead professional at the Canadian Jewish Congress at the time, im-
mediately stepped up. I remember how importance it was to Ben to help every 
Jew in Cuba live a full Jewish life by finding a way to get them kosher-for-Pass-
over food.124 
Imbibed with a fraternal sense of assisting fellow Jews, the CJC of the early-2000s 
continued the example set by the previous generation. Keith Landy, a former CJC 
President, reiterated the same spirit and resolve his predecessors had on the impor-
tance of the shipment of religious supplies to Cuba. “This is a festival of freedom, a 
festival of joy, and we’ve recognized that the Jewish community of Cuba really has 
not lived as a free community.”125 
The political landscape has shifted dramatically since the halcyon days of the CJC’s 
leadership in Cuba. Prior to Fidel Castro’s death, power was transferred to his broth-
er Raul, and a once-hopeful rapprochement between America and Cuba has turned 
into dissolution and mistrust. Nonetheless, the seeming transition of institutional 
power, its gravitational return to the mean, away from the CJC and back to American 
Jewry marks the end of a unique chapter in Canadian Jewish history. In 2015, Bernie 
Farber alluded to the likely changes to arise amid such developments. “It may not 
happen tomorrow or the day after, but some day in the foreseeable future, American 
Jews will step to the plate and deliver to their co–religionists in Cuba the goods and 
products that today are provided by Canadian Jews.”126
In many ways, this story is one which could not have been told without the Cold 
War, superpower politics, and competing transnational alliance blocs.127 It was here, 
amidst these tremendous global forces, in which the CJC was able reach new heights. 
In retrospect, the achievements of the CJC are notable and all the more so because 
of their popular oversight. Contrary to public conceptions of Canadian Jewish in-
stitutions as solely engaging in secondary/supportive roles, the CJC’s involvement in 
Cuban Jewish affairs since the 1960s is a testament against such generalizations. The 
dedication and passion with which the CJC sprung forth into Cuba is witnessed with 
the near-instantaneous acceptance of responsibility for the Cuban Jewish commu-
nity in the wake of the severing of American—Cuban diplomatic relations. The CJC’s 
impact was felt instantly and acknowledged by the WJC as early as March 1961, mere 
months after assuming responsibility for the community.128
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Time and again the CJC, alone, provided invaluable insights which American Jewry 
and the JDC could not. More importantly, the CJC exhibited a remarkable tact for 
political finesse. Be it cautioning against antisemitic fears or warning against pub-
licizing the issue as “rescuing” or “saving” Cuban Jewry for the potential political 
blowback it would engender. The CJC conducted itself during these critical years 
with great professionalism and impartiality. 
Unfortunately, the organization’s efforts have been largely forgotten over the years. 
Despite the hopes rekindled by recent political developments, no genuine popular 
recognition was extended to the CJC for its service over the preceding half-century. 
The main page of the communal website for Cuban Jews is draped with a banner 
touting, “The Cuba—America Jewish Mission.”129 Under the banner, a history tab 
brings visitors to a short history of the community which seemingly progresses as 
every standard narrative of Cuban Jewry would. However, following the Castro Rev-
olution, the story skips ahead thirty years to the collapse of the Soviet Union. There 
is a historical void of thirty years in which unsuspecting visitors peer ahead, beyond 
the Cold War, unaware of the tumultuous history which bridges the ostensible be-
ginning and ending of Cuban Jewry’s “Dark Age.” Neither Canada nor the CJC are 
mentioned in their history.130 Similarly, in recent articles by Haaretz, JTA, and the 
Miami Herald, there is no mention of the CJC’s involvement.131 
Perhaps this is the ultimate irony for Canadian Jewry: that the CJC spearheaded 
operations dedicated to Cuban Jewry for the past half-century remain unacknowl-
edged is disappointing, yet unsurprising. This essay has been a story chronicling the 
achievements and dedication of the CJC, in stark contrast to the often-misconceived 
view of Canadian Jewry’s role in international affairs. And yet, ultimately historical 
reality has receded like ocean waves to popular imagination. The story is one of 
historical tragedy in social memory, but seemingly with a happy ending. How ironic 
that of Cuban Jewry’s fears of being forgotten one day, it was the CJC which even-
tually suffered such a fate.
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